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Post  script 
After decades of monetary anarchy since independence, the enactment of the 
Monetary Law of 1881, and the subsequent experiments of the 1880s with 
bimetallism and free banlung regimes, marked a moment when Argentina’s 
policymakers started to search for monetary and fiscal stability. In the face of 
challenges common to all  developing countries on the periphery of an inte- 
grated global economy, this search was marked by struggles and failures, most 
notably the spectacular Baring Crisis of 1890-91, which can be seen as the first 
emerging-market crisis of the modern era. 
The  lessons of the crisis informed the design of new institutions. From 1891 
until the creation of the central bank in 1935, the Caja de Conversion, Ar- 
gentina’s first currency board, unilaterally enforced a hard gold-standard mon- 
etary regime in an attempt to provide a firm nominal anchor and restore the 
confidence of foreign investors. Monetary stability was achieved and economic 
growth was impressive, at least prior to the First World War.  But the system 
didn’t last, and there were signs of increasing vulnerabdity in the financial sector 
during the interwar period.  The monetary regime prevented any Lender-of- 
Last-Resort actions, so volatility in world financial markets hit Argentina hard. 
Our book has shown that institutional “learning by doing” in the search 
for macroeconomic stability was  a notable  feature of Argentina  from  1880 
to  1935.  To invoke an expression of Charles Kindleberger, one senses that 
Argentine economic history could be summed up as being part of the never- 
ending struggle of “rules versus men.”’  However, we have shown that the 
extremely rich political-economy story can be interpreted and rationalized in 
the light of the modern apparatus of economic analysis. In this way, we have 
integrated in one approach extremely complex features such as money, public 
debt, and private finance. Employing such formalism, we seek the advantages 
of explicitly spelling out the underlying economic models. Though the formal 
approach requires more effort, it is of the utmost importance in revealing the 
1. Kmdleberger (2000). 
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rationales ofArgentine  policymakers, and why their economic strategy switched 
back and forth between strict “rules of the game” and broad discretion. 
Original Sins: ATale of Monetary Double Standards 
As a concrete example of what we have learned from this approach, recall the 
chronic use of the inflation tax  in the decades after independence, from the 
1820s  to the early 1860s (Figure 1.3). It  should not be perceived as having been 
just an inefficient tax on domestic money holders but, moreover, as a dispute 
over the distribution of seigniorage among the different provinces. This was 
at the heart of the struggle between one of the most powerful economies of 
the hemisphere, the Province of Buenos Aires, and the other provinces in the 
Argentine Confederation.  It was  not only a fight over who would have the 
power to tax international trade, but also about more subtle ways of financing the 
governments’public expenditures. As Samuel Amaral has put it, the discovery of 
inflationary finance in the Province of Buenos Aires “enlightened” the political 
class and the caudillos of the other provinces, and in the issuance of fiduciary 
money they all saw a most welcome way to enlarge fiscal resources? 
Of course, it was here that the first major monetary design problems began 
for the small open economy of Argentina. Policymakers started thinking that 
money could function under a double standard: one standard for internal pur- 
poses (for this, read “try to extract as much seigniorage as you can”), another 
standard for external purposes (an internationally accepted standard to promote 
international finance and trade). The inherent contradictions of this plan did 
not stand in their way.  From the time of independence in 1810, until the cre- 
ation of the Conversion Office in 1890, domestic and external goals habitually 
alternated as the focus of Argentina’s monetary policy regime, a corollary of 
alternating political-economy decisions. And, as it later became clear, this was 
not an easy habit to break. 
The first external convertibility plan, from 1868 to 1875,  failed. It gave way 
in the 1880s  to a new doctrine that favored a system ofplural  banks ofissue, per- 
mitting those banks to issue gold-guaranteed paper notes (wrongly described 
as a “free banlung law”). This system was established alongside the 1881  law 
that established gold and silver as the bimetallic legal tenders for internal trans- 
actions, an attempt to restrict competition between different metallic monies. 
The new plan was derailed by attempts to deploy activist monetary policy de- 
spite the force of the macroeconomic trilemma. This scheme, plus the attempt 
to limit the use of other metalk monies-which  may be seen as a very primitive 
precursor of capital controls-was  a recipe for sure disaster. But it provided a 
wonderful laboratory for economic historians, namely the Baring Crisis. 
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The  First Emerging Market Crisis: Local Causes, Global Effects 
We have shown that the Baring Crisis of 1891  was a phenomenon that entirely 
originated in domestic political-economy choices, namely an acute misman- 
agement of public debt and serious violations of time consistency in economic 
policies. It is now well understood that if a sovereign country is to have good 
standing, or a sound reputation, in its two major liabilities, money and bonds, 
then the expected solvency of the government should be beyond question. 
If a country violates the consistency between monetary and fiscal policies and, 
hence, the intertemporal government budget constraint is not met, we know 
that at some point the government will have no option but to choose among 
several bad outcomes.  In other words, if the “promised” values of money and 
debt cannot be sustained through time because of budget constraint violations, 
then there is no way out. A government will have to default either to money 
holders, or to bond holders, or distribute the losses in some particular way in 
the form of a partial default to both. 
The inconsistencies in public debt management were clear in Argentina for 
the years 1888-91, a time when the government was pursuing an expansionary 
fiscal policy while simultaneously precommitting to restore a gold-standard 
regime.  For a while, capital inflows could finance the conflicting monetary 
and fiscal actions, but the policy of sterilization after the balance of payments 
turned negative only financed an intense process of currency substitution by 
private agents as the speculative attack loomed. Collapse came about when all 
the government’s specie was virtually depleted. 
The specific details of policy inconsistency during the 1880s give us  a new 
perspective on what an old and enduring problem we have in emerging-market 
crises.  We have argued that the Baring Crisis can be seen as the first occur- 
rence of this new breed of crisis.  The Argentine policy mix included a fixed 
exchange-rate commitment (which at times degenerated into a dirty float); the 
free mobility of capital; a developing economy that for a short time was the dar- 
ling of the world’s financial markets; banks that made dubious loans to cronies 
(including their provincial overlords); balance sheets that were beset by matu- 
rity and currency mismatches (borrowing short in gold, lending long in pesos); 
no effective prudential banhng regulation and oversight; and a monumental 
crash that brought intervention from a would-be International Lender of Last 
Resort, the Bank of England? 
3. Compare to a typical description of the recent Asian crises: “So what is the underlying cause 
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The Baring Crisis is also one of the first examples of how an ill-fated small 
open economy can produce devastating spillover effects that radically change 
the size and direction of international capital flows in the world as a whole. In 
the early 1890s the London capital markets hastily retreated from investments 
overseas, after seeing such a massive and unprecedented crisis that almost wiped 
out a major house. The resulting tightening of capital markets depressed eco- 
nomic activity in many newly settled countries, such as Canada and Australia. 
The “contagion” thus affected countries that were, initially, very far from the 
events in Buenos Aires that precipitated the crisis. 
Similarly, the recent 1997Asian  crisis developed in relatively small economies 
but had negative effects for emerging capital markets as a whole, and followed 
again despite the intervention of a different body seeking to act as International 
Lender of Last Resort,  this time the IMF. After the recent crises in Asia, 
the ingredients in the Baring Crisis all sound very familiar, and likewise the 
outcomes. An optimistic reaction is to feel assured that the fundamental features 
of these crises have not varied so much in the long run, suggesting common 
economic and institutional problems and potential solutions.  A pessimistic 
reaction is to wonder why, a century later, we are still left trying to figure out 
what those solutions are. 
Curing  a Bad Hangover: Good versus Bad Default 
One important lesson from the Argentine experience is that when collapse ar- 
rives because credibility has totally eroded, even if the government attempts to 
implement textbook reforms to restore good economic policies, it is probably 
too late. The transversality condition will only be met by defaulting on some 
government obligations. This could be interpreted as a discretionary action ex 
post vis-&,is  what would  have been the “correct” policy to implement ex ante. 
Basically you have no choice and you need to reset the initial fiscal conditions 
that will make credible the future adoption of intertemporally consistent mon- 
etary and fiscal policies.  Paradoxically, in this state of classic debt overhang, 
you can only regain reputation for the future through default, by shedding the 
insolvency created by obligations inherited from the institutionally flawed past. 
The Baring Crisis delivers some important lessons for the present.  In fact, 
history seems to have repeated itselfwith the Argentine hyperinflation of 1989- 
90 and the convertibility plan devised to end the crisis.  In the recent case, in 
1990,  before the adoption of a currency board and a dollar-exchange standard, 
the Argentine government had to default in some way. They chose to convert, 
by decree, all short-run time deposits (on average, seven-day maturity deposits 
invested in very short-run public bonds by private banks to finance the public 
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Bonex 89 yielding the LIBOR rate.4 This was one way to smooth out public 
finance outlays by a forced rescheduling of the debt payments. The  lesson again 
is that, before the highly orthodox convertibility plan could be put in place, the 
government had to rely on a very heterodox institutional shock to satisfy the 
transversality condition. 
In our historical context, exactly one hundred years prior to the so-called 
Bonex plan, in 1891  Argentine policymakers chose a similar path. They elected 
to heavily tax (read, default on) domestic money and deposit balances through 
a large devaluation and the closure of a large number of domestic financial 
institutions (more than 40 percent of total financial intermediation).  President 
Carlos Pellegrini’s  choice was to preserve Argentina’s reputation in international 
debt and capital markets. One detail that is not very well known here is that the 
Argentine Republic never technically defaulted on its bearer external debt or 
bonds. This  was thanks to the Bank of England, which acted as an International 
Lender of Last Resort for the benefit of, in essence, the widely dispersed group 
of bondholders. 
The  importance of the leadership shown by Pellegrini is clear. He convinced 
congress that the prospects of the Argentine economy were intimately linked 
with international markets for goods, labor, and, especially, capital.  To have 
opted to default in that international scenario would have risked condemning 
Argentina to a long period of autarky, at that time surely a suboptimal strategy 
of economic development for a capital-scarce economy. Even with a policy of 
“good behavior” in international capital markets from then on, Argentina had 
to take the extra step in 1898 of nationalizing all  the provincial and municipal 
external debt-only  after that, could it tap fresh funds in the international 
capital markets. 
Escape &om a Trap: The  Asymmetry  of  Inflation and Deflation 
After the crisis, fresh problems appeared.  The drastic monetary, fiscal, and 
financial reforms of 1891-92  produced a new economic phenomenon.  A de- 
flationary scenario set in under a monetary rule that we termed the Gesell- 
Friedman rule, by which the government switched to a goal of fixing the quan- 
tity of monetary base to halt the depreciation of paper money. 
There was a protracted deflation of domestic prices and observers like Sil- 
vio Gesell, who was later quoted by Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes, 
saw the asymmetric effects of inflationary and deflationary regimes.  Gesell’s 
arguments about the disruptive effects of deflation on domestic investment 
proved convincing. The extremely costly dynamics of monetary policy, aimed 
at restoration at the old par via a steep deflation, were stopped. Thus, the years 
4.  LIBOR is the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, a global interest rate benchmark for safe assets. 
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1891-99 provide an extraordinary laboratory to allow us to understand the dif- 
ferences between disinflating an overheated economy, and the danger of going 
too far and entering a path of deflationary expectations. 
As we saw toward the end of the book, deflationary expectations were not 
avoided during the short-lived 1927-29  Gold Standard period.  However, we 
showed how, under those extreme circumstances,  with the use of good economic 
intuition backed with credibility and a sound monetary and fiscal situation, 
some very able policymakers were able to put in place a new macroeconomic 
regime to drastically alter the deflationary expectations prevailing until 1931. 
We constructed a dynamic model of exchange rates, prices, and interest rates to 
illustrate how good policy actions mattered for Argentina’s recovery from the 
Great Depression. 
The  search for price and monetary stability this time took the form of a change 
in the optimal monetary and exchange rate regime.  By using up a relatively 
abundant and idle government asset, namely international reserves and specie 
in excess of the legal requirement of the convertibility law, the monetary regime 
shifted in 1931 toward targeting and anchoring the nominal quantity of money 
and the level of prices. Only this could convince agents to discard their views 
as to the likely persistence of deflationary pressures. This, in turn, lowered ex 
ante real interest rates and boosted recovery in the real sector. The policy was 
a success in that, by any standard, Argentina was only mildly affected by the 
Great Depression.  This turnaround constituted a classic example of the real 
effects of changing expectations i la Sargent.  It showed how one can use an 
inflationary regime change to escape a liquidity trap, that is, when one is close 
to the nominal interest rate floor in a deflationary scenario. 
With the so-called “taming of inflation” witnessed in many countries in the 
1990s, discussion again has turned to the threat of deflation in the event that 
central banks err too far on the side of tightening policy.  This could be par- 
ticularly harmful in the event of a major recession coupled with deflationary 
expectations. It is no wonder then that current events in Japan are prompting 
such fears, and justifying comparisons to the 1930s and, for those with longer 
memories, the 1890s. The Argentine experience is highly relevant here, since 
once the economy stabilized in the late 1890s there began a spectacular pe- 
riod of economic growth and prosperity that is rightly remembered as the Belle 
Epoque. We can only wonder whether some contemporary  Japanese equivalent 
of Silvio Gesell waits in the wings to argue for a radical policy shift to change 
expectations and restart economic growth in what is, by long-term measures, 
an economy with still outstanding prospects based on fundamentals. Postscript  227 
Local  versus Global Finance: Bank Stability in an Open Economy 
We noted that previous scholars have curiously neglected the question of the 
extent of financial deepening in emerging countries during the interwar period. 
We have shown that  Argentine financial intermediation technologywas not very 
strong and could not fill the void left by the downsizing of the London capital 
market after 1914. Here we found some important features that differentiate 
the banking experience of Argentina from, say, that in Canada or in the United 
States.  For the latter, it has been said that the absence of a well-diversified 
branch banking system made financial institutions extremely fragile in the event 
of a negative idiosyncratic shock to a particular city or region.  In the case of 
Argentina, there was  an ongoing process of branch banking and geographic 
diversification-but  the financial system was  nevertheless prone to recurrent 
crises and the banks, especially the domestic ones, were subject to  sizeable 
capital crunches. In particular, there were markedly different lending responses 
in domestic and foreign banks when subject to shocks. 
The volatility of lending by banks in a globalized international capital market 
is something that deserves close scrutiny In the Argentine case, while foreign 
banks brought more efficient and voluminous lending, they also “overreacted” 
to changes in the fundamentals of this emerging market economy. The issue is 
obviously relevant today, given the almost unanimous belief that the interna- 
tionalization of banking is always welfare enhancing for a small open economy. 
The usual argument says that if there is an idiosyncratic shock, a well diver- 
sified bank (read, an international bank) will basically smooth out the regional 
shock by reallocating assets or liquid funds to or from world  headquarters. 
However, this assumes that the branches in a particular region, say Argentina, 
are treated pari passu like any other branch within the country of origin (or in 
the global network) of the bank in question. 
However, our study suggests that in spite of a dramatic internationalization 
of banking in Argentina, especially between 1895 and 1913, foreign-owned 
banks still heavily weighed  country-specific risk factors in their conduct of 
banking business in their theoretically multinational enterprise.  In practice, 
we think this meant that there was an in-house segmentation of branches or 
country networks. If that was (and is) the way banking businesses operate then 
one might ask if the welfare enhancing effects of the internationalization  of 
banking are truly realized. This is a serious and very open question for countries 
currently pursuing openness and financial liberalization, and raises the question 
as to what steps should be taken under a fixed exchange-rate regime to minimize 
the fugacity of foreign exchange. 
A final question regarding financial structure also emerges from the Argentine 
macroeconomic experience. In  particular, we are intrigued by the very different 
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and domestic private banks (a high proportion of long-maturity assets). What 
does this mean for the nexus of the financial system and the supply of capital 
for domestic investment? 
Our empirical evidence suggests that the “overreacting”  behavior of foreign 
banks and the “underreacting” behavior of domestic banks were a result of 
their asset structures.  Typically, in bad financial times banks try to call up 
loans to increase their liquidity cushion.  However, not all loans are equally 
liquid.  Foreign banks specialized in commercial short-term and trade finance 
while domestic banks invested in industrial, venture, and real-estate finance. 
Domestic banks built  a comparative advantage in longer-term  lending and 
local monitoring but they were subject to huge capital crunches in the event of 
a negative shock because they were doing precisely what a bank is supposed to 
do, engaging in the transformation of the maturity of assets. 
The  Dilemma: Internal  versus External Convertibility 
We  saw that domestic banks could not attain high leverage so as to advance 
large quantities of credit for long-term endeavors. This suggests a clue to un- 
derstanding the financial fragility (and suboptimality) of small open economies 
in search of monetary stability. Part of the broader trilemma, we call this the 
dilemma of internal versus external convertibility, referring to the tension be- 
tween inside versus outside money. 
In the last part  of the book we  addressed in more detail the role of the 
financial sector as a possible source of monetary-regime inconsistency. Again, 
if the money supply is a multiple of the monetary base, we should care about 
the behavior of the money multiplier.  The banking sector creates secondary 
money by means of the deposits they hold. However, under a fixed exchange- 
rate regime the monetary authority, the Conversion Office, assumed only a 
macroeconomic responsibility for preserving the external value of money. It had 
no instruments to assume the microeconomic responsibility of guaranteeing the 
stability of the financial system. 
This monetary “separation of powers”  was the intent, at least; but we showed 
how, in practice, the banking system did not function without constant bailouts 
from the state bank and, when that was left insolvent, from the Conversion 
Office itself.  While such an eventual conflict of interest might be held as an 
institutional failure in the Argentine case, it is a very common confusion. For 
example, it reveals  no more or less inconsistency than was seen the founding 
charter of the U.S.  Federal Reserve Board.  The Fed was  there  authorized 
to preserve the value of money and also act as a Lender of Last Resort, two 
fundamentally incompatible goals given a single instrument? 
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We can see some quite clear parallels with recent experience here too in 
many emerging economies, but most clearly so in Argentina.  Consider the 
1995 shocks following the December  1994 Tequila Crisis in Mexico.  The 
currency board had to sit tight while a run on fractional reserve deposits hit 
the banking system. An 18  percent fall in deposits in 4 months made for some 
painful choices. Afterward, the government negotiated alternative fiscal sources 
for Lender of Last Resort provision, specifically a contingent credit line with 
various major banks, but at the time it had little power to respond. 
Heuristically, we can see the multiple equdibrium possibilities immediately. 
If you have a bad banking system you can have macroeconomic consistency 
threatened  by a run from deposits to cash to the reserve currency, the “bad 
equilibrium” where the interest rate defense fails. A “good” equilibrium with 
strong banks is possible, but here leverage may be very low (because reserves 
are high), implying less intermediation and weak financial depth. 
Steering a course here proved hard for Argentina in the 1920s, just as it 
has for many emerging markets today seeking to blend private and state-led 
financing of growth. Argentina’s problem was a defective intermediary, a weak 
link in the chain, the Banco de la Nacion.  This “too big to fail” state bank 
unilaterally took on board Lender-of-Last-Resort  prerogatives. But even as it 
did so it completely failed to adhere to sound Lender-of-Last-Resort practices. 
Instead of offering plentiful liquidity at a penalty rate with good collateral ii  la 
Bagehot, the bank offered crony loans at a rate even below the deposit rate, and 
took on board dubious “lemon loan” paper via rediscounting:  These were not 
principles by which a well-structured  banking system could survive, but this 
lesson is still being rediscovered in the Asian economies after the crises of 1997. 
It is at this point worth asking:  can countries avoid the dilemma of inter- 
nal versus external convertibility altogether?  We know that two very radical 
alternatives exist, one or both of which might be followed in the future.  One 
way to avoid runs is via the adoption of a “narrow banking” system, that would 
make banking deposit insurance redundant, with the major class of retail banks 
only permitted to be “mutual funds” holding government bonds, thus allow- 
ing deposits to be “priced” and eliminating inside money entirely. The other 
option sidesteps the risk of a run via a unilateral currency union (read, dollariza- 
tion), eliminating outside money entirely. The overall picture of a chaotic and 
misdirected evolution in monetary and banking institutions in the Argentine 
historical case lends considerable appeal to these alternative prescriptions for 
regime consistency in emerging markets. 
Ultimately, unresolved tensions between internal and external convertibility 
inherent in a small open economy must bring about radical institutional changes, 
as we saw in the Argentine case. First, in 1931, came the de facto end of the 
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metallic monetary regime.  Then, in 1935, came the creation of the central 
bank to relieve the still dismal private and public financial situation.  Yet can 
we call these proactive institutional changes (in particular the creation of the 
central bank)?  Or were they the reactive result of a dynamically inconsistent, 
ill-conceived monetary and financial structure? 
Unsolved political-economy dilemmas (or trilemmas) are the dual of polluted 
economic institutions in a dynamic context. Thus, as we have said before, in 
a regime where you have incompatible goals in some bad states of nature, it is 
just a matter of time before well-conceived institutions fall apart under political 
or discretionary manipulation.  In this case, it was the Great Depression that 
triggered a radical change.  The upside of the post-1931 policies was  a rapid 
macroeconomic recovery; the downside, an unpleasant little secret of the period, 
was the vast expenditure on bailing out a very large mess in the financial sector. 
These two events, side by side, show clearly the key dilemma. 
Macroeconomic  Success: Recovery from the Great Depression 
The work of economic historians  has led to a new consensus as  to the role 
of the gold standard in fostering deflation and depression in the 1920s and 
1930s, and the critical impact of monetary policies as a tool for macroeconomic 
recovery7 Yet evidence is largely restricted, at a detailed level, to the study of 
the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and other countries in the core. 
Further research is now needed to see how the same approach can be applied 
to the World Depression at the periphery. 
We argue that Argentine macroeconomic policies in the 1930s did success- 
fully avert a major disaster by subverting, if only marginally, the prevailing 
orthodox mentaliti' inherited from earlier epochs.  Like the core economies, 
Argentina found itself with little room for maneuver in fiscal matters, a con- 
straint that was made even tighter by the need to service a large external debt. 
Fiscal orthodoxy was offset, however, by a bold change of monetary regime, 
from metallic to fiduciary, in an effort to dislodge deflationary expectations. 
This plan was the brainchild of Raul Prebisch, and was a testament to his 
creativity and brilliance as an economist and policymaker. The actions of the 
Conversion Office in the Spring of 1931 predated the British departure from 
gold by a good  six months, and United  States interventions  by  almost two 
years.  Events in the history of thought and events in economic history were 
most clearly intertwined in the Argentine experience. Gesell's insight came in 
the economic crisis that followed an attempt to pursue rigid metallic rules in the 
1890s as a prelude to resumption at the 1881 parity. Thirty-two years of gold 
standard orthodoxy by the Conversion Office could not diminish the relevance 
7.  See, inter aliu, Eichengreen and Sachs (1985); Ternin (1989); Eichengreen (1992a; 1992b) ; 
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of his ideas in a time of serious deflation.  As the prospect of a repeat of the 
recessions of the 1890s and 1914-19  loomed, the penetrating ideas of Prebisch 
held sway as those of Gesell had a generation before. 
In summing up, though, excessive optimism concerning the change of regime 
should not be read into our story In the long run there was rather too much 
reliance on expansionary monetary policy in subsequent Argentine history, as 
elsewhere in Latin America.  Hyperinflations in many countries brought the 
need for exactly the opposite kind of regime shift a la Sargent.  That shift 
eventually came to Argentina in an all too familiar form. In 1991 a return to a 
currency-board rule was instigated with much popular support after all patience 
had been exhausted with the previous sixty years of floating exchange rates and 
persistent, often wild, inflations. 
The current convertibility law puts Argentina on a dollar-standard rule very 
similar to, and in some ways stricter than, the gold-standard mechanism used 
at the Conversion Office from 1899  to 1931. Apart from one tough recession, 
economic performance has been impressive in the last few years. Though little 
else would be familiar, one might imagine that a visitor arriving from the 1880s, 
1900s, or 1920s, would feel very much at home with today’s dollar-peso rule. 
Yet knowing as they did the pitfalls of a metallic regime, and the crises of the 
1890s, 1910s, and 1930s, one cannot be very sure that Silvio Gesell or Raul 
Prebisch would so comfortably travel back to the future. 
Microeconomic  Costs: Institutional Cascades and a Bad Architecture 
The 1880-1935 period in Argentina provides a clear example of how economic 
crises-most  of the time more than one!-can  induce institutional changes in 
a cascade fashion. However, the cascade, or, as one might say, the “institutional 
learning by doing process,” ended up polluting the originally well-conceived 
institutions. Ultimately, a new institution, the central bank, had to be created to 
clean up the mess dynamically  engendered by the polluted trio ofthe Conversion 
Office, the Banco de la Naci6n Argentina, and the private financial system. 
The costs of this route were large and not limited solely to the state bank. 
As early as 1931,  with the Conversion Office rediscounting to the Banco de la 
Nacion, and the latter rediscounting to private banks in an exceptionally bad 
state, the “lemon loans” on state’s balance sheet grew large.  Moreover, in an 
idiosyncratic financial structure that coupled a quasi-Lender of Last Resort with 
no banking regulation, the risky ventures of at least four of the most important 
Argentine private banks were grossly exacerbated. 
This state of affairs led to a clean-up task assigned in 1935 by Congress to 
a specially created institution, the Instituto Movilizador de Inversiones Ban- 
carias (IMIB).  We  discuss the precise details of the IMIB bailout operation in 
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very large by any standard.  The main source of funds for the operation were 
the central bank‘s seigniorage profits arising from the decision to devalue the 
peso parity from 2.27 paper pesos per gold peso to 4.96 in 1935. Suddenly, a 
huge accounting profit of 701 million paper pesos accrued to the government. 
This was allocated to various uses as  follows: to retire some federal floating 
debt, around 95 million; to augment banking reserves in the central bank, 216 
million; and to fund the bailout operation by IMIB, 390 million pesos. 
In short, IMIB received 55 percent of the proceeds of the gold revaluation, 
a sum that in itself represented a 58 percent increase in the quantity of outside 
money. How  costlywas this operation to Argentine households? Such a massive 
seigniorage tax amounted to about 7 percent of 1935 gross domestic product. It 
is important to note here that the assets bailed out, a total of 553 million pesos, 
amounted to 16 percent of the loans of the entire financial system (including 
Banco de la Nacion), or 32 percent of the loans of the private banking system. 
That is, fully one third of the private financial system was rotten, a very large 
financial crisis by any standard. This upper-bound estimate of the social costs 
was equal to 5.5 percent of output. A lower-bound estimate of the social costs 
of the bailout would be the injection of cash to the financial system, amounting 
to 390 million pesos or 4 percent of output.  And it need hardly be said that 
the main beneficiaries of this action were the principals and investors of the 
soon-to-fail banks concerned, so the transfer was effectively directing 4 to 5 
percent of output to an already wealthy group in society. 
Thus, this was a very large banking failure and bailout by any standard. We 
must, however, be careful with intertemporal comparisons. The costs relative 
to output hardly do full justice to the scale of the bailout operation because, 
given the low level of financial development in the early twentieth century, the 
banking sector was small relative to output.’  Contemporary emerging market 
crises may have caused a greater loss of assets as a fraction of output, but rarely 
(if ever) have we seen the case of a country with as much as one third of its 
banking sector assets destroyed.’ And, of course, this static real resource cost 
understates the long-run costs resulting from the destruction of a (once) clean 
and well-functioning  set of institutions.  Thus, we cannot be  anything but 
pessimistic about the potential costs of poor institutional design in emerging 
market economies; but we can be optimistic to the extent that these illustrations 
from history can help prevent a repeat of the recent spate of crises. 
8. See Goldsmith (1969). 
9. “Contemporary conventional wisdom tells us that emerging-market crashes are more frequent 
and severe than ever before. But even a casual newspaper reader 15 years ago could have very 
well reached the same conclusion.  The truth is, currency crises in emerging economies are 
nothing new. Judging by how much capital fled, Latin America saw worse crises in the 1980s 
than in the 1990s. In  Asia, however, the late 1990s have brought far worse crises than anything 
experienced earlier. They have affected a greater share of global gross domestic product. They 
have also caused substantial recessions, though it seems that economic recovery is occurring 
more quickly than it did during the 1980s debt crisis” (Minton Beddoes 1999). Cartoon 10.1. Just0 -  Sirvase; atan my  bien adobadas.  PuebLo -  Precisamente, par eso  ies fengo 
miedo. ([President] Justo -  Help yourself; they are very well marinated. People -  Precisely, that’s 
why I am afraid of them.) 
Nofes;  The dishes are the central bank (a turkey), the new banking  law (a  chicken), and  the 
Instituto Movilizador de Inversiones Bancarias (a pig).  There is a double meaning in the word 
adobado (marinated): it can also mean that there is an unclear or nefarious arrangement.  In this 
cartoon the public suspects that what has been cooked up isn’t really so good. Moreover, if it had 
been so tasty, there would have been no need for the waiter, Justo, to insist so much. 
Source:  Carusy caretas, aiio 38, no.  1907, April 20, 1935. 234  Straining at  the Ancbor 
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A concise way to sum up Argentina’s experience would be to present it as a 
problem of bad design in the overall financial architecture.  Certain elements 
looked reasonable and stable on their own, but put together the entire edifice 
could not hold up to the eventual strains. 
This observation has some fairly clear implications for how we view recent 
calls for reform of the world‘s financial architecture. The  Argentine experience 
shows that-to  stretch the metaphor-a  little repainting here and there, some 
new wallpaper, or a rearrangement of the furniture might not suffice to make 
a structure  sound.  Rather, what might be needed at the level of a specific 
country is a tear down, or at least full attention to the whole structure right 
down to the foundations. Partial reforms of money and banking regimes could 
be ineffective, and might even be damaging. 
In the Argentine case it is clear where the architectural renovations paid off, 
and where neglect in the design stage came back to haunt everybody.  A safe, 
quasi-narrow bank such as the Banco de la Nacion, and a Conversion Office 
set up as a currency board to maintain a good reputation, were created to solve 
the 1890s crisis. It  was hoped that, unlike their predecessors, they would never 
descend to soft-budget constraint activities. But external economic forces and 
internal political manipulations during the interwar period generated a set of 
challenges and temptations that disturbed the institutional design and pulled 
it ever so gradually off the rails until there was no possibility of return. 
External discipline could not solve all the problems.  The Conversion Of- 
fice was internationally visible, easily monitored and verified; it was a clear and 
sound adoption of the rules of the game, a well-behaved and consistent in- 
stitution in this small open economy.  Much less visible (internationally and 
domestically) was the financial system and its workings.  In the first phase 
of its existence (1891-1913)  the new Argentine money and banking regime 
functioned smoothly, faced few shocks, and was little tampered with by poli- 
cymakers. In its second phase (1913-34), a series of economic shocks polluted 
first the private banking system and then, despite a seemingly solid design to 
prevent bailouts and moral hazard, took down the Banco de la Nacion and the 
Conversion Office as the illness spread. 
The end result was the creation of an institution-the  central bank-that 
could, with the help of opaque and dubious maneuvers by  IMIB, cover up 
the mess and finally throw in the towel on the idea of external convertibility. 
Loosening the nominal anchor was to have adverse long-run implications for 
inflation performance. And having no compelling restraint on the bailouts used 
to protect internal convertibility,  the central bank embraced a Lender-of-Last- 
Resort function with regard to the private banks that was to invite moral hazard 
and continuing real resource drains for decades to come. Postscript  235 
With  banks subject to neither supervision, nor banking laws, nor regulations, 
and with the mysterious ad hoc evolution of the Banco de la Nacion, the system 
got itself on a path toward inconsistent policies. Instead of a classical Lender- 
of-Last-Resort system, a free insurance or bailout scheme was the end result. 
This need not have compromised the Conversion Office and Argentina’s com- 
mitment to stable macroeconomic policies. But when the 1929  crisis hit, it was 
so big that the banking system’s weakness threatened  a disastrous collapse of 
intermediation absent a rescue, and further real costs. The price was to abolish 
the Conversion Office and revalue gold, once and for all losing the notion of 
parity that had endured since the 1899 resumption. 
With the loss of a commitment to a stable external value of the currency and, 
in the longer run, to a stable price level, the geniemoney printing-was  yet 
again out of the bottle. We might consider how Sarmiento, Roca, or Pellegrini 
would have viewed these events.  These former Presidents saw Argentina as 
having an internal tension between progressive sectors of society seeking to 
create modern institutions with clear rules of the game, and conservative forces 
seeking to maintain a status quo where outcomes usually depended on arbitrary 
forces and the manipulation of power and influence. Sarmiento’s magnum opus, 
Facundo [Civilizacion i barbarie], was devoted to exactly this issue. 
The Conversion Office in some sense epitomized the economic attempt at 
civifizarion,  by playing to clean rules and meeting externally verifiable standards 
and monitoring.  The more clandestine relationship between private finance 
and the state, and the capacity of the private and provincial banks to obtain 
successive bailouts from the Banco de la Naci6n via political means, were more 
reminiscent of barbarie. 
In the end, in the sphere of macroeconomic policy at least, the results seem 
clear. The Belle Epoque was marked by prosperity in incomes, not in institu- 
tions. By accident or, we might say, by lack of design, barbarie triumphed. 